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I. INTRODUCTION
The convenors of this symposium have asked us to think about
due process. Much of the due process literature in the United States
considers how individuals can defend themselves against the power of
the state1 and focuses upon equipping individuals for their confronta-
tions with the state.2 Some commentators see the purpose of pro-
cedural safeguards as enhancing accuracy - that a correct result is
achieved when state and individual clash.3 Others look beyond this
goal and articulate aspirations for due process in addition to generating
acceptable outcomes. Thoughtful commentators such as Jerry Mashaw
*Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. B.A., 1972, Bryn Mawr
College; J.D., 1975, New York University.
This paper has been infornled and challenged by discussions at the University of Florida's
symposium, at the University of Southern California Law Center, at Dave Trubek's workshop
on civil litigation and research on procedure at Harvard Law School, and with Anfonso Datnico,
Bob Bone, Jules Coleman, Ron Garet, Ruth Gavison, Catharine Hantzis, Frank :MicheIman, and
Martha Minow. My thanks for research assistance to Rosario Herrera and Carlos Yguico. Special
thanks are owed to Denny Curtis and Peggy Radin, for their very helpful comments on and
the conversations sparked by earlier drafts. Some of my thoughts on these issues were shaped
in conversations with Bob Cover, to whom I can no longer give thanks but whose thoughts on
law and whose modes of action continue to infornl my work.
1. See generally NOMOS: DUE PROCESS XIII (J. Pennock & J. Chapmall, eds. 1977).
2. The United States Supreme Court has developed a doctrinal approach in which, if a
protected liberty or property interest is asserted, the question is "what process is due?" See,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
3. Illustrative are Justice Powell's opinion in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976),
and Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2995 (1986).
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and Frank Michelman have spoken about aspects of due process that
advance individual dignity and efficacy.4
In this essay, I suggest a related but somewhat different set of
issues for inclusion in our understanding of due process. For me,
fairness to the individual and the generation of acceptable outcomes
does not exhaust the content of due process theory. These comments
are a preliminary effort to articulate another dimension of that theory.
I seek to analyze the effects of and upon a third group, perhaps best
described as the "public," in the ongoing process of dispute resolution.
I am interested both in the role of the public in the process, and the
function of the process for the public.5
My concern to include the public in a conception of due process is
not driven only by thoughts that the public's role is to control state
power or to augment individual dignity. Rather, I believe that process
is better understood when viewed as encompassing more than an
atomistic confrontation between an individual and the state. My work-
ing assumption is that the public/process relationship is important and
worth thinking about as we consider how much and what "process is
due."
My endeavor is complicated by at least two problems. First, how
should I name this entity that exists in addition to the state and the
individual? As the title indicates, I have chosen to use "the public,"
but not without hesitation. The word "public" crops up frequently in
the language of due process, of procedure, and of courts. Concerns
about procedural due process arise in the context of "public" decision-
making; so-called "private" decisionmaking is not circumscribed by the
same requirements of procedural fairness. 6 Many who write about
procedure speak of "private" lawsuits,7 of "public law litigation,"S of
4. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative AdjUdication
in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
28 (1976); Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right to Protect
One's Rights, 1973 DUKE L.J. 1153.
5. These comments are related to both Bob Cover's and Frank l\fichelman's critique that
Ronald Dworkin posits his judge, Hercules, without including the context in which the judge
acts or the dependence of the judge upon others. See Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE
L.J. 1601, 1626-29 (1986); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Tenn, Foreword: Traces of
Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 75-77 (1986).
6. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory:
A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV., 1289, 1296 (1982).
7. See, e.g., In re Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1335-36
(D.C. Cir. 1985).
8. See generally Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976).
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"public" versus "private" rights,9 of "public," court-based adjudication
versus "private" arbitration or other processes,10 as if we all shared
an understanding of what falls within these categories. ll
Despite its omnipresence and imprecision, "public" seems an apt
term in this effort to flesh out the image of a third entity within a
due process framework. The public is, of course, already present when
state and individual clash. First, those individuals who actually con-
front state power are a subset of the public. Second, the public is the
state. Our employees - judges, jurors, magistrates, administrative
law judges or the like - have the power to speak for the public and,
in theory, according to norms generated by the public. Yet, in my
view, the public is somehow also a third party, apart from both indi-
viduals and the state, and playing a variety of roles, including those
of witness, audience, critic, foil, and commentator.
By using the word "public," I hope to denote a political community,
the citizenry of the United States, but I do not intend, and I hope
\vill not be read, to suggest that this citizenry is a unified group. That
the United States is hetereogeneous is obvious. There are many "pub-
lics," and thus many witnesses, audiences, critics, foils, and commen-
tators. 12 In fact, it is partly because of the multitude of groups, each
with its own values and norms, that I am concerned about the need
to articulate a public dimension. Adjudication must always occur
against a backdrop of conflict over what norms should govern. Hence,
while I use the words "public " "our " and "we " it is always with a
" ,
sense that there are many distinct "ours" and many "publics,"
9. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585-86 (1985).
See generally Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 581, 592-603
(198.5). Critical commentary about the limits of a "private" rights model is offered by Simon,
The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 :MD. L. REV. 1 (1985).
10. See Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358,
1365-66 (1982); St. Antoine, Jv.dicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at
Enterprise Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1137 (1977); cf. Mnookin & Kornhauser,
Bargaining in the Shadow ofthe Law: The Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 953-55 (1979).
11. The idea that a problem exists in understanding the parameters of "public" spheres is
not new. See, e.g., PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN SOCIAL LIFE (S. Benn & G. Gaus eds. 1983);
Rose, The Comedy of the Comnwns: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53
U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); Seidman, Public Principle and Providate Choice: The Uneasy
Case ferr a Baundary Maintenance Theary of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1006 (1987);
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986); Sym-
posium: The Public/Private Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982). The insights developed
in these commentaries have not been used in many of the conversations about drawing public/pri-
vate distinctions in procedure.
12. See Cover, The Supreme Caurt 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983).
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My second difficulty comes in attempting to explain how and why
the presence of the public affects procedure. Below, I review some
of the rationales extant in the legal literature. The dominant themes
are that Anglo-American jurisprudence has a tradition ofpublic partici-
pation, that the process educates the public and provides catharsis,
and that the public acts to check decisionmakers and to enhance accu-
racy. Thereafter, I suggest another explanation: that the interaction be-
tween process and public is important and assists in the development
of legal norms about the merits of disputes and about how disputes
should be handled. All the explanations offered rest upon assumptions,
as empirical documentation of the process/public interaction is impos-
sible. All the explanations offered are also subject to criticism, at least
some of which is provided below.
One final comment by way of introduction. This essay is an effort
to begin a conversation about a public dimension in adjudication and
dispute resolution. We are currently in an era of interest - on both
the theoretical and practical sides - in procedural modeling. Over
the past two decades, many proceduralists in the United States have
become increasingly intrigued by what are called "alternatives" to
adjudication.13 In the current enthusiasm for "alternative dispute res-
olution" (ADR), many urge courts to adopt or to incorporate proce-
dures such as mediation, judicial settlement conferences, arbitration,
"mini" trials, and "summary" trials. 14 In 1983, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were amended to affirm a role for federal judges as
facilitators of settlement and to authorize judges to advocate "extrajud-
icial" means for the resolution of disputes. 15 Yet aside from an occa-
13. See, e.g., the recently begun reporter, Alternative Dispute Resolution Rep. (BNA) (1st
ed. Apr. 30, 1987). Of course, ours is not the first generation to be intrigued by responses to
disputes other than adjudication by judges. See, e.g., The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, 9
U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982); H. SCOIT, THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK: THEIR HISTORY,
DEVELOPMENT AND JURISDICTION 43-44 (1909); Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy:
The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305 (1985) (discussing The Federal
Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982».
14. See, e.g., Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost ofLitigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 253
(1985); Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Set-
tlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485 (1985).
15. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(7); see also C. SERON, THE USE OF STANDARD PRETRIAL
PROCEDURES: AN AsSESSMENT OF LOCAL RULE 235 OF THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
GEORGIA (Fed. Judicial Center, 1986). The Court of Claims just joined the bandwagon. See,
Notice to Counsel and General Order No. 13, Ct. Cl. (Apr. 15, 1987).
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sional comment about the pleasures of privacy in dispute resolution,16
the literature of ADR is virtually silent on a role for the public in the
processes promoted. I believe that this silence is an error and that
we ought to be self-conscious about decisions to provide either for
private or for public procedures. Below, I offer some comments on
what might influence thoughts about "public" and "private" processes.
I do not write in a spirit of definitiveness but rather in the hopes of
sparking others to join with me in thinking about this issue.
II. THE ROLE OF AN AUDIENCE: "PUBLIC" ACCESS
At first glance, this inquiry appears simple. A ready answer to
why one would carve out a role for the public comes with the words
"Star Chamber." Images of closed, secret, oppressive processes and
of state exploitation of its power spring readily to mind. But explaining
the harms of closure and the benefits of openness is more complex
than might be anticipated. Such explanations have been called for, in
the context of adjudication,17 when judges order that trials be closed
or that records be sealed, and either parties or non-parties (often
members of the media) argue for openness. As a consequence, doc-
trines about access to court processes have evolved, as judges have
interpreted the first, sixth, and fourteenth amendments to the Con-
stitution and the common law. I8
My interest here is not in the development of such doctrines or in
the reach of the "right" of access. Rather, I am intrigued by what
judges describe themselves as accomplishing when crafting or limiting
a role for the public. One of the most fulsome examples of judges
speaking to this question is Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia. I9
In that case, a criminal defendant, John Paul Stevenson, was facing
his fourth retrial on murder charges. His lawyer asked that the trial
be closed to the public. The prosecutor did not object, and the state
trial judge ordered the courtroom cleared. Reporters challenged the
16. See, e.g., L. KANOWITZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RES-
OLUTION 11 (1986) (advantages of arbitration include that the "dispute can be left private since
the decision is not necessarily a public document ....").
17. Administrative law has also responded to these issues. See, e.g., Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); Dunn, Judging Secrets, 31 VILLANOVA L. REV. 471 (1986).
18. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(discussed infra notes 19 to 26 and accompanying te:x"t); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n
v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom
of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
19. 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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closure, but the judge declined to vacate the order, and instead,
excluded the press and public from the courtroom.20
Seven justices of the United States Supreme Court agreed that
the closure of the courtroom was unconstitutional, although they could
not readily agree on the nature of the unconstitutionality. Six opinions
were filed in support of the judgment.21 The differences among the
justices centered on whether the right infringed was protected by the
first or the sixth amendments, whether the Court ought to mandate
access for both civil and criminal trials, and whether the holding in
the case necessarily overruled prior precedents. 22 Seven justices a-
greed, however, that there was something wrong with excluding the
public - at least in the instance at hand.
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices White and Stevens, wrote
an opinion that gives three rationales for public access to criminal
trials. 23 A first argument is founded in history. The Chief Justice
described an "unbroken, uncontradicted history . . . of openness" of
criminal trials.24 Burger claimed that, as a matter of historical fact,
the public has always been permitted to attend such trials and there-
fore that the public should continue to be permitted to attend such
proceedings.
I have three problems with a claim of openness based upon history.
The first is that, as an empirical matter, the claim may be in error.
I have substantial doubt about anyone's ability to capture accurately
a picture of how trials were conducted in the past. While the Chief
20. [d. at 556-61.
21. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White and Stevens in a plurality opinion
holding a constitutional right of access under the first amendment to criminal trials. [d. at 580.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that the first amendment gave a right of
access to all trials. [d. at 598. Justice Stewart wrote separately to discuss the parameters of
what he believed to be a first amendment right to all trials. [d. at 599. Justice Blaclanun joined
the judgment but argued that the Court should have found a sixth amendment right of open
trials and of other proceedings. [d. at 603. Justice Stevens also wrote a concurrence in which
he stressed the need for protection of the press. [d. at 584. Justice Rehnquist dissented. [d.
at 604. Justice Powell did not participate.
22. For example, Justice Blaclanun argued that the holding in Ruhrnmul Newspapers vin-
dicated his partial dissent in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 406 (1979). See 448 U.S.
at 601. Justice Stevens argued that the Court's decision in Ruhrnmul Newspapers supported
his views on the need for press access. [d. at 584.
23. 448 U.S. at 576. Note that, at least in this case, the Chief Justice was not deterred
by the fact that such rights are not expressly stated in the text of the Constitution. [d. at 579
(rights not "enumerated" may still be recognized).
24. [d. at 573. For more history, see Max Radin, The Right to a Publu Trial, 6 TEMP.
L.Q. 381 (1932).
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Justice asserted that he had found an "unbroken" line of open access
to trials,25 my guess is that practices probably varied; in some places,
with little documentation or fuss, judges may well have ordered pro-
ceedings closed. In fact, in the transcript of the closure hearings in
Richmond Newspapers itself, the trial judge and lawyers shared recol-
lections of trials that had been closed to the public.26 Furthermore, in
recent years, energetic social scientists have substantially increased
our knowledge of trial court practices. Reports describe variations in
trial practices from jurisdiction to jurisdiction27 and demonstrate that
cases with written opinions are atypical when compared to the bulk
of cases filed. 28 Given the spottiness of even contemporary data, I
question the completeness and accuracy of accounts about how trials
of earlier centuries were conducted and who attended them. 29
But the problems of history are not limited to issues of recovery
of artifacts. Procedure changes over time. For example, we have elimi-
nated some elements of trial (such as jurors with direct knowledge of
the disputed events) that we used to cherish.30 It is not self-evident
that the trials of the past provide adequate instruction on contempo-
rary process. Finally, even if we knew the history and even if the
modes of process had not changed, the question remains whether what
was done in the past was good or bad. Reflection upon past practices
may lead to change. For example, a New York court recently rejected
a time-honored practice in that jurisdiction of sealing courtrooms when
judges instructed jurors.31 Simply because we have, in the past, either
included or excluded the public does not confirm that we should do
the same today.
While I am uncomfortable founding an argument for a public role
in history, I am also uncomfortable assuming that history has nothing
25. 448 U.S. at 573.
26. Appendix, Richmond Newspapers, at 18a.
27. On plea bargaining, see Schulhofer, No Job Too Small: Justice Without Bargaining in
the Lower Criminal Courts, 1986 A.r.I. B. FOUND. RES. J. 519. On diverse handling of asbestos
litigation, see D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN, & P. EBENER, AsBESTOS IN THE
COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS TOXIC TORTS (lnst. for Civil Justice, Rand Corp. 1985).
See generally Trubek, Studying Courts in Context, 15 LAW & Soc'Y 485 (1980-81).
28. See Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, Tlze Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72 (1983) [hereinafter Ordinary Litigation].
29. For one account, see 1\1. TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC:
KENTUCKY, 1789-1816 (1978).
30. Kershen, Vicinage (pt. 3), 30 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 75-76 (1977).
31. People v. Venters, 124 A.D.2d 57,511 N.Y.S.2d 283 (App. Div. 1987) (''however hoary
and time honored such a practice may be, [it] does not pass constitutional or statutory muster").
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to teach us. Whether "unbroken" or sporadic, whether right or wrong,
there is some tradition of a role for the public in adjudication. In the
United States, we have held as a value the practice of permitting
non-litigants to attend some court proceedings and have understood
courthouses as "public" places.32 While an explanation for a public
dimension cannot rest on the fact of tradition alone, we must acknowl-
edge our history and attempt to learn from it.
The Chief Justice provided a second argument for public access to
criminal trials. According to his opinion, there has been "widespread
acknowledgement . . . that public trials had significant community
therapeutic value."33 How did, or does, the therapy work? The Chief
Justice linked openness to the special qualities of the criminal trial.
In his view, when a "shocking crime occurs," the community needs a
means to express "natural human reactions of outrage and protest. "3-1
Without public trials, we run the risk of "self-help . . . of vigilante
'committees.' "35 But, when the public is able to watch "justice done"
and to see "retribution," "community catharsis" results.36
This catharsis rationale has problems. First, assuming for the mo-
ment that some members of the public need to vent their emotions
when they learn about the commission of a crime, I wonder whether
attending trials, reading newspaper reports, or seeing televised por-
tions of trials provides a suitable vehicle. The trials in the United
States that I have attended, either as a spectator or as a litigator,
seem remarkably unemotive. In contrast to other rituals, such as some
religious services or rock concerts, much of the style, pace, and manner
of a trial seems designed to rein in and to control emotions. Indeed,
at times when emotions run high, such as during the Chicago Seven
trial, courtrooms are cleared, participants admonished - and some-
times even bound and gagged. 37 During such events, judges and com-
mentators discuss problems of "order in the COurt."38 Some of the
32. See, e.g., 448 U.S. at 578.
33. Id. at 570.
34. Id. at 571.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (trial judge may order that disruptive defendant
be removed from the courtroom or be bound and gagged); see also Holbrook v. Flynn, 106 S.
Ct. 1340 (1986) (uniformed state troopers in courtroom). See generally United States v. Seale,
461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); In re Dellinger, 461 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), on remand, 357 F.
Supp. 949 (N.D. Ill. 1973), on remand, 370 F. Supp. 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd, 502 F.2d 813
(7th Cir. 1974), em. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975); CONTEMPT: TRANSCRIPT OF THE CONTEMPT
CITATIONS, SENTENCES, AND RESPONSES OF THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY 10 (1970).
38. See generally N. DORSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT (1973).
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concern is based upon experience. Infamous cases such as Franks v.
Magnum39 and Moore v. Dempsey4° remind us of the powerful influ-
ences of emotions and the darker expressions of communities' passions
on the fate of individuals charged with crimes. Surely, the audience-as-
lynch-mob was not the kind of "catharsis" that the Chief Justice had
in mind.
Moreover, even if trials could be cathartic events for the public,
trials often occur months after the events at issue. In Richmond
Newspapers, the alleged crime had been committed in December of
1975, a first trial was held in July of 1976, and the trial at issue
occurred in September of 1978.41 Did the Chief Justice believe that
"community concern, hostility, and emotion" would be satiated by an
open trial, no matter how long the interval between crime and trial,
no matter the number of trials? Further, the fact of an open trial is,
in and of itself, no assurance that the community will either attend
or learn of the proceedings. Why believe that attention is paid or
lessons learned?42 Why should we assume that trials are effective
vehicles by which members of the public, or even judges, lawyers,
and perhaps disputants, express angst, release tension, or achieve
purgation and spiritual renewal?
I am skeptical about whether even the direct participants obtain
much by way of psychic relief from contemporary modes of adjudica-
tion. I am also not confident that seeking catharsis in adjudication is
a good idea. Yet, I do believe trials have the capacity to generate
emotion. What trials can provide is a sense that something is happening
as the witnesses speak. That which unfolds may sometimes be dull
and dry, and we may need a good deal of background information to
interpret the proceedings. Nonetheless, trials (and some of the other
forms of dispute resolution) are times when stories are told. As the
success of soap operas suggests, the unfolding of a story in bits and
pieces can capture our interest and perhaps can even provide a sense
of vicarious participation. Further, the stories generated may become
the shared tales of a variety of citizens - across social and ethnic
39. 2.'37 U.S. 309 (1915).
40. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
41. 448 U.S. at 559-62.
42. See, e.g., Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Uplwlding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1984); Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute
Resolution among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1986). For discussion
of the impact of watching trials on the audience, see Barber, Televised Trials: Weighing Advan-
tages Against Disadvantages, 10 JUST. Sys. J. 279 (1985).
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boundaries. While I am reluctant to embrace a theory of trials as
catharsis, I am at ease with an aclmowledgment of trials as vehicles
for generating potentially powerful narratives.
Chief Justice Burger saw a third purpose to open criminal trials.
Relying on Wigmore and Bentham, the Chief Justice described trials
as having "an educative effect,'" as "an opportunity both for under-
standing the system in general and its workings in a particular case."43
The education is supposed to result in "a strong confidence in judicial
remedies."« This claim rests upon a series of assumptions: that people
lmow what happens in courtrooms, that they understand the proce-
dure, appreciate what they see, and as a result, feel positively about
the criminal justice system in general.45 Certainly, the Chief Justice
is correct that, with public access, the information that is generated
becomes available, but the uses to which the information will be put
are far from certain.
While arguments based upon catharsis and education assume that
the process can provide for the public, another claim (of which Justice
Brennan has been a prime spokesperson) is based upon the notion
that the public can do something for the process. Justice Brennan,
writing a concurrence joined by Justice Marshall in Richmond News-
papers, argued that the audience was "an indispensible element of the
trial process itself."46 Justice Brennan grounded the right of public
access on the first amendment, which he believed played a "structural
role"47 by encouraging public debate. While sharing the Chief Justice's
interest in history, Justice Brennan drew a different lesson: "public
access to court proceedings is one of the numerous 'checks and bal-
ances' of our system, because 'contemporaneous review in the forum
of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial
power.' "48 For Justice Brennan, the public was a "safeguard,"49 and
"public scrutiny" was essential to "the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered."so
43. 448 U.S. at 572.
44. Id. (quoting 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1834, at 438 (rev. ed. 1976».
45. Reports on jury comprehension of instructions, for example, suggest that jurors do not
understand a good deal of standard legal language. See A. ELWORK, B. SALES, J. ALFINI,
MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE (1982); see also Barber, supra note 42
(psychologists generally report low rates of retention of information).
46. 448 U.S. at 597.
47. Id. at 587 (emphasis in the original).
48. Id. at 592 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948».
49. Id.
50. See id. at 593 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968». See also Holmes'
comment in Cowley v. Pulsifer, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884):
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The claim of the public-as-a-control needs some sorting out. How
exactly does the presence of an audience serve to check judicial power?
In the federal system, unlike some state court systems, federal judges'
jobs are for life. Judges need not depend upon favorable public opinion
to maintain their employment.51 Further, while Justice Brennan as-
sumed a public interested in "the government's fair and equal dealing
with all,"52 can we be so sure that the public will be sympathetic to
norms of fairness, that the public has standards at least as high, if
not higher, than judges?53 The public can only function as a political
check if the public has the power to control and standards by which
to assess judicial behavior.
Perhaps Justice Brennan was making a psychological, rather than
a political, claim. He might have assumed that judges are invested
in, or could be taught to be invested in, reputations for fairness.
Judges might be "civilized" by the requirement of having to act in
front of the public.54 Recall, however, the assumptions embedded in
Chief Justice Burger's argument for the cathartic function of criminal
trials. The Chief Justice saw criminal trials as vehicles for expression
of hostility, retribution, and blame. Might not an audience who shares
those views delight in an angry judge? Justice Brennan must have
assumed that the community of spectators would hold values other
than those expressed by the Chief Justice, and that such an audience
would seek dispassionate, rather than "vindictive," justice.55 Such as-
It is desirable that the trial of causes should take place under the public eye, not
because the controversies of one citi2en with another are of public concern, but
because it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always
act under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able
to satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in \vhich a public duty is
performed.
51. Compare the position of some state judges, such as the former Chief Justice of the
California Supreme Court. See, e.g., Endicott, Bird Lovers, Haters Get Setfor '86, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 27, 1985, § IV, at 1, col. 1.
52. 448 U.S. at 595.
53. See, e.g., NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT TASK FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS
(1st Report, 1984; 2d Report, 1986) (discrimination against women); NEW YORK UNIFIED
COURT SYSTEM, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION, REPORT OF THE NEW YORK TASK
FORCE ON WOMEN IN THE COURTS (1986) (also discount against women).
54. See Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the
Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WISC. L. REV. 1359, 1377-87 ("pre-
judiced persons are least likely to act on their beliefs if the immediate environment confronts
them with the discrepancy between their professed ideals and their personal hostilities against
out-groups"); see also Rose, supra note 11, at 779-81 (the values of sociability).
55. See Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fresco, Allegory of Good Government, in Sienna's Pala2Za
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sumptions certainly have appeal; both the rhetoric of fair-minded judg-
ment and the images of justice56 support arguments that judges will
be self-conscious, at least in public, about living up to the ideals of
equal treatment and impartiality.
Justice Brennan had another rationale for public access - that the
presence of the public enhanced factfinding in two respects. 57 First,
witnesses unknown to the parties might step forward. While such a
belief animated the writing of Perry Mason's stories, I am skeptical
about the frequency with which public proceedings turn up new evi-
dence.68 The second aspect of Brennan's accuracy claim was that those
who testified would speak more truthfully in public than if permitted
to testify in private.59 This is an empirical question. Other decisionmak-
ing processes are based upon the opposite assumption, that people
speak more truthfully in private than in public. For example, many
requests for comments on the desirability of affording tenure to an
academic are accompanied by promises of confidentiality. The premise
is that commentators will be more truthful if they know that their
views will not be subjected to public scrutiny.
These five rationales - history, catharsis, education, control, and
accuracy - are what one finds in the legal literature about why the
public has a role to play in some adjudicatory procedures, most typi-
cally in criminal trials. All the arguments rest upon assumptions, most
of which are unverifiable. I think that these arguments do not capture
all that might be said, albeit again based on unverifiable assumptions,
about the public's role in process.
First, while' the education and control arguments suggest some
kind of interaction between public and process, these arguments do
not explore much about the nature of the interaction. Consider one's
own experiences with public and private moments. I speak differently
in public than in private, in moments such as this, when I know, or
Publico, in which three "Justices" are depicted, one labeled "Distributive Justice," one labeled
"Commutative Justice", and one labeled ''Vindictive Justice," discussed in S. EDGERTON, JR.,
PICTURES AND PUNISHMENT: ART AND CRIMINAL PROSECUTION DURING THE FLORENTINE
RENAISSANCE 32 (1985).
56. See Curtis & Resnik, The Images of Justice, 96 YALE L.J. 1727 (1987).
57. 448 U.S. at 596-97.
58. But see Stern, The Right of the Accused to a Public DefffiSe, 18 lIARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 53, 80-82 (1983) (effect of publicity was to enable defense to have access to evidence that
would otherwise have been unavailable).
59. See 448 U.S. at 597 (citing 3 W. BLACKSTONE COMMENTARIES); see also Stern, supra
note 58, at 54 (innocent rape defendant enabled to defend by virtue of atmosphere created by
trying the case to the public via the press).
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hope, that strangers read my words than in moments when I choose
who receives my words. I try to interact with an audience. I hope
that my behavior affects the audience, and I believe that the presence
of an audience affects my behavior. Note that I am not making a claim
that the words I speak in one setting are intrinsically "more true"
than the words spoken in the other. Rather, I claim a difference exists
when strangers, rather than only those invited, can attend.
The difficult question is whether the difference matters. To consider
this problem, return to Richmond Newspapers. The day after the trial
was closed, the trial judge entered a brief order. We learn only that,
after the prosecution put in evidence, the defense counsel
moved . . . to strike the . . . evidence on grounds stated to
the record, which Motion was sustained by the Court.
And the jury having been excused, the Court doth find
the accused NOT GUILTY of Murder ....60
With a courtroom closed, the interaction between public and process
is limited. Not only can we not control or be educated, we cannot
share or participate in any way. 61
The notion of interaction is, of course, related to the control and
education arguments made by others, but there are some distinctions.
For example, when Justice Brennan spoke of the public as a safeguard,
he seemed to assume that when judges work within reach of the
public, we the public can check to be sure that judges are acting in
accordance with established norms. In other words, there are norms
out there, and the public can look to those norms to see if judges
have done their duty.
For me, the situation is more fluid. I am not so confident that
norms are prefixed, independent of the disputes they govern. Rather,
I believe that the norms are generated in the course of the interaction
among disputants and adjudicator, and among disputants, adjudicator,
and the public. This is an interaction over time, during which the
polity develops, learns about, and changes the norms that govern
disputes.
This interactive, norm-generative function seems important be-
cause, as I mentioned at the outset, "we" are not a single, homogeneous
community. Rather, we are a series of publics, with values at great
variance, and we live in fragile coexistence.62 Perhaps if "we" had
60. The record, as quoted by the Chief Justice at 448 U.S. at 562 (footnote omitted).
61. Professor Meiklejohn ascribed to the first amendment a related function; the openness
of the society created the possibility of achieving shared understandings and political commit-
ment. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH: ANn ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
102-07 (1948).
62. See Cover, supm note 12.
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well-defined mores, I would not wonder about how judges dealt with
disputes. Perhaps if "we" were an insular community, our wise elders
might be entrusted with responding to disputes, and we would not
require information because of our shared knowledge of the guiding
principles. 63 But our society is not communal in that sense.64 For better
or worse, there are a multitude of communities, and we cannot sit
back in the comfort that judges will deal with our conflicts within a
fabric of rules that we share and that nurture us. We cannot even
know of our conflicts or our norms.
One way to illustrate this point is to consider "public" norms in
transition. For example, this society is greatly confused about its
treatment of women. On one hand, "we" espouse notions of fair treat-
ment while, on the other, "we" tolerate a substantial amount of abuse
of women.65 A few years ago, domestic violence was considered to be
unfortunate, but not always legally impermissible, behavior. Police
often did not report complaints, and complainants were sometimes
encouraged to adjust to abusive situations.66 More recently, at least
at a formal level, "we" have come to perceive such abuse to be unac-
ceptable.67
If one understood a role for the public in adjudication as based on
the need for public education, this example would suggest that litiga-
tion about abuse has enabled us to learn about violence that might
otherwise have remained invisible. If one understood a role for the
public as based on the need for control of judges, then one would
argue for public access to ensure that the "new" norms are applied
in such cases.68
63. But see the comments of the defendant's lawyer in Richrrwnd Newspapers when arguing
for closure. He said, "this is a small community, it's not like in a big city where you've got
three hundred thousand people [from whom to choose jurors]." Appendix at 15a.
64. See Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV.
1001 (1983); Levinsion, Constituting Communities Through Words that Bind: Reflections on
Loyalty Oaths, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1440 (1986); Mann, Law, Legalism, and Community Before
the American Revolution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1415 (1986).
65. Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087 (1986).
66. Lerman, Mediation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute
Resolution on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984).
67. See Nix, Police Step Up Attack on Domestic Violence, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1986, at
12, col. 1; See generally Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work and
the Problern of Expert Testirrwny on Battering, 9 WOMEN'S RTS L. REP. 191 (1986).
68. While Bentham saw the importance of public access for control of decisionmakers, he
was prepared in matters involving women and family (as well as a few other instances) to qualify
his arguments about the importance of publicity. 1 J. BENTHAM, BENTHAM'S RATIONALE OF
JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 560 (1827).
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Because I also see an interactive, generative role for the public,
I use this example to comment on the creation of the new norm. How
did the transition from acceptance of violence against women to at
least some questioning of that violence69 occur? My guess is that public
participation in disputes between abusers and abused was one of sev-
eral factors that influenced this development. We the public sit not
only to learn about norms and to prevent application of the "wrong"
norm, but also to be part of the process of changing norms. We create
our social rules out of individual sagas of claims of right. By under-
standing that a role for the public in process is based in part on this
need for interaction, we stress the expressive qualities of procedure,
the use of process as one way to give meaning to cultural values such
as dignity of individuals. Further, by having public participation, we
gain the possibility of generating shared narratives of powerful signifi-
cance. Process may provide a vehicle for - briefly - creating a
shared community and, of course, process may also be the occasion
by which the war of our many communities is plainly revealed. 70
Take the recent case involving the conflicting claims of right to
parenthood of Mary Beth Whitehead and the Sterns.71 At great per-
sonal pain to the disputants, we all sat as an audience, considering
aspects of family life some of us had not known to be possible. The
emotive power of conversations about the issue were, I believe, partly
a function of the way in which the story unfolded. No abstraction, no
49-page opinion, could drive us - and divide us - as profoundly as
the nalTative created by the daily unfolding of the case. While learning
about outcomes can teach us about the ''law as power," we can only
experience the ''law as meaning" if we have more than outcomes with
which to work. 7'2
In short, because I believe that adjudication is one aspect of the
political life of the United States, I believe that our polity needs to
play some role in that process. The process is us; the conflict is ours.
We should not try to deny, alienate, or obliterate our disputes, for if
we do, we lose important parts of our own stories, which are needed
69. Violence against women is still acceptable to some. See C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED (1987) (esp. ch. III, Pornography).
70. See, e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (a woman's claim for
treatment equal to that afforded men in the tribe versus a tribal claim for discriminatory
treatment of women).
71. In re Baby "M," 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1987); certlfu:ation
of appeal and limited visitation granted, 107 N.J. 140, 526 A.2d 203 (1987).
72. Cover, supra note 12, at 18.
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to inform us about how we should understand and govern ourselves.
Finally, even if we wanted to avoid such conflicts, those whom we
empower would determine outcomes and enforce them in our names,
and we must accept responsibility for such actions.
Thus, I offer a sixth rationale for public in process: interaction to
assist in the expression and generation of norms. But like the five
that preceeded it, interaction/norm generation has some problems.
First, while sociologists and anthropologists attempt to capture the
process of norm generation, no one can assert with assurance how it
works. Perhaps the unfolding sagas confuse us, distract us, or over-
whelm us with a force disproportionate to their content.73 Second,
adjudication is but one arena for such interaction. Other processes
may be as well, if not better, suited to the task. 74 Third, the examina-
tion of conflict may be destructive, rather than generative. Too much
exploration of the differences among us may result in polarization.
Fourth, many factors, including media decisions about what events
are the most intriguing, affect which sagas take hold of our imagina-
tions. That dependency upon others to cover, translate, and communi-
cate may create profound distortions. Fifth, why assume that articu-
lation of either disputes or norms is generally valuable? Perhaps it is
creative to leave conflict unexplored, to protect us from having to
articulate rules that may be in tension with societal aspirations. 75
I am sure there are other problems with interaction and norm
generation as a rationale for a public role. But I will move on to
uncover a few more of the complications in thinking about a public
dimension to adjudication and dispute resolution. Thus far, the com-
mentary has been focused upon trials. If one were to believe, for any
of the reasons set forth above, that the public had some role to play
in process, two questions remain: in which processes, and what kind
of role?
III. THE MODES OF ADJUDICATION
As the discussion of Richmond Newspapers illustrates, much of
the caselaw on a public role has arisen in the context of criminal trials.
Does a focus on criminal trials, as contrasted with other modes of
73. R. NISBETT & L. Ross, HUlIlAN INFERENCE (1980) (vividness ofinfonnation can lead
to false attributions).
74. See Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980).
75. See, e.g., Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in
Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). Compare Minow, Beyond State Intervention in
the Family: For Baby Jane Doe, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 933 (1985).
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adjudication, make sense? The law of procedure and of due process
has assumed the coherence of such distinctions. I want to raise a few
of the problems with drawing such lines in the context of considering
the public's role. By suggesting that the distinctions are not particu-
larly persuasive in this regard, I am not suggesting that these distinc-
tions have no utility at all. 76
One might argue that ''we'' the public have some role to play in
criminal, but not in civil, trials because the criminal law attempts to
attach moral culpability to particular kinds of behavior. A criminal
action is commenced by a representative of the state on behalf of us
all. In contrast, claims of civil wrongdoing are often initiated by non-
governmental officials. Civil wrongs, while wrong, are not wrong in
the same way as are criminal acts, and hence, "we" the public have
no role - historical, cathartic, educative, controlling, improving accu-
racy, interactive or generative - to play on the civil side.
This account fails, however, to consider the difficulty in distinguish-
ing between criminal and civil wrongs. How do we lmow to call a
lawsuit "criminal" or "civil"? The identity of the parties is insufficient,
because government may initiate both "criminal" and "civil" actions
against individuals or entities. The remedies sought are also inadequate
tests; individuals may be confined both "civilly" and "criminally" and
can be required to pay "criminal fines" or "civil penalties." The chal-
lenged behavior fails to provide sure guidance, because the very same
activities may violate both criminal and civil laws.77 Even the title of
a statute under which a case is initiated proves unreliable, for the
"civil label is not always dispositive."78
Take a recent discussion of the labeling problem, Allen v. Illinois. 79
The state charged a defendant, Terry Allen, with being a "sexually
76. For further discussion of the utility and disutility of the criminal/civil distinctions in
procedure, see R. COVER, O. FISS, & J. RESNIK, PROCEDURE [forthcoming 1988]. Note that
another distinction of fonnerly great import to procedure - that between "equity" and ''law''
- was diminished by the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. FED.
R. CIV. P. 2 states that there shall be "one fonn of action." See Clark & Moore, A New Federal
Civil Procedure - I: The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 415-35 (1935) (urging a single set of
rules); Simplifying Procedures in Federal Courts, 2 U.S.L.W. 866 (May 14, 1935) (address of
ChiefJustice Hughes to the American Law Institute). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,
promulgated in 1967, apply to both criminal and civil appeals. See Order of December 4, 1967,
389 U.S. 1065 (1967).
77. Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1023 (1985).
78. See Allen v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2988, 2992 (1986) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448
U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
79. 106 S. Ct. 2988 (1986).
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dangerous person," but contended that its charge was civil, not crim-
inal. The defendant argued that he was facing criminal charges and
should therefore be able to assert a fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. Justice Rehnquist, writing on behalf of a five person
majority, concluded that because the Illinois legislation was aimed at
"treating" - rather than "punishing" - Mr. Allen, the action was
"civil."80 In contrast, Justice Stevens, on behalf of the four dissenters,
believed that the "substance of the Illinois procedure" and the fact
that, if found to be a "sexually dangerous person," Mr. Allen could be
placed in a maximum security prison, required that he be afforded
the protections of the fifth amendment.81
Of course, Allen v. Illinois illustrates the problems of using
dichotomies. As the dissent pointed out, the Illinois procedure was
"neither wholly criminal nor civil."82 That comment has application
beyond the context of those charged with being "sexually dangerous."
If by "criminal" actions we mean to denote those proceedings at which
we should protect individuals from government overreaching, then we
should be concerned when the powerful adversary can obtain either
"punitive" incarceration or "rehabilitative" detention.83 And why not
worry when the state as adversary seeks to terminate the rights to
parent,84 or to receive welfare benefits85 or to revoke licenses for
jobs?86 Further, the state is not the only powerful adversary. "Private"
litigation can result in the end of parental rights, the transfer of assets,
the stigmatization of individuals, or the vindication of rights. Whether
called "criminal" or "civil," adjudication is that process by which gov-
ernment-empowered officials impose decisions upon disputants. If
there is a role for the public when John Paul Stevenson is accused of
a crime, there is a role for the public when Terry Allen is charged,
80. Id. at 2994.
81. Id. at 2995-97.
82. Id. at 2999 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court has also noted that habeas corpus
proceedings fall somewhere in between. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 847, 920-26
(1984). Federal prisoners who seek one form of habeas corpus (via 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982)) file
what are called (since 1977) post-trial motions in their criminal cases. However, when habeas
corpus petitions are filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1982), new "quasi-civil" actions are
commenced. See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969).
83. The majority in Allen v. Illinois sought to determine whether the legislation was ''puni-
tive" in "either purpose or effect," or if the legislation was aimed at "treating" an individual.
106 S. Ct. at 2992-94.
84. See Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
85. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 309 (1970).
86. See Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91 (1981).
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when victims of domestic violence seek help from the state, and when
the Whiteheads and Sterns attempt to obtain legal recognition of their
rights.87
Another line frequently drawn is between trials, or trial-like ac-
tivities,88 and other forms of adjudication, such as decisions on motions
to dismiss or for summary judgment. At first glance, trials and eviden-
tiary hearings appear to be the obvious occasions upon which to invite
the public. Several factors support the inclusion of the public: recall
Chief Justice Burger's history, as well as the potential for drama that
accompanies the giving of testimony and the exercise of state power
when verdicts are rendered. But witnesses testify not only at trials
but also at depositions, and judgments are rendered not only after
live testimony, but also after the submission of papers. There are
adjudicative instances other than trial, and to complicate matters
further, there are dispositions other than by adjudication.
87. Courts have, in fact, gone beyond Riehrrwnd Newspapers to recognize rights of access
to a variety of hearings and to some of the documents filed in court. The Court has mandated
access to preliminary hearings in criminal cases, see Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court,
106 S. Ct. 2735 (1986), and to hearings on suppression motions, see Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S.
39 (1984). Cj. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (first amendment does not
prohibit protective orders sealing discovery materials); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,
435 U.S. 589 (1978) (no access to copy tapes that had belonged to the President).
FOt' a sampling of some of the lower courts' responses, see In re Washington Post Co.
(United States v. Soussoudis), 807 F.2d 383,389 (4th Cir. 1986) (right ofaccess to plea, sentencing
hearing, and to documents filed in connection with such hearings; claim of national security does
not warrant closure without procedural safeguards); United States v. Smith (In re Patriot News
Co.), 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d. Cir. 1985) (access to bill of particulars); United States v. Martin,
746 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1984) (presumption of access to all judicial records, including those not
admitted into evidence); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) (access to report of special
litigation committee in shareholder derivative action), eert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). But
ej. United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438 (11th Cir. 1986) (newspaper had no right of access
to list of unindicted co-conspirators in bill of particulars), eert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1567 (1987);
In re Reporters Committee, 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (no constitutional or common law
right of contemporaneous access to documents relied upon when judge rules on summary judg-
ment); Seattle Times v. Eberharter, 105 Wash. 2d 144, 713 P.2d 710 (Wash. 1986) (en banc)
(no constitutional or common law right of access to affidavit, not filed but used to support a
search warrant). For discussion of the standards by which to decide when closure would be
permitted, see In re Knight Publishing Co., 743 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1984).
88. See United States v. Smith (Doe), 787 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1986) (access to side bar
conferences held to discuss evidentiary issues in criminal case); In re Herald Co. (United States
v. Klepfer), 734 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1984) (constitutional right of access to "many aspects of a
criminal proceeding"); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1984) (first
amendment and common law right of access to civil proceedings in a hearing on a motion for
a preliminary injunction); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983) (constitutional
right of access to bail hearing).
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In the federal system, fewer than five percent of all civil cases
and thirteen percent of criminal cases reached trial in 1985.89 Some
cases were settled by mutual consent of the parties, others were
withdrawn, and still others terminated by dispositive rulings made by
trial judges.90 With the advent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
came mechanisms that have increased the potential for a diffuse, rather
than concentrated, mode of adjudication.91 And with contemporary
perceptions of large caseloads come increasing pressures for non-ad-
judicative means by which to dispose of cases.
As I noted at the outset, enthusiasm for alternative dispute reso-
lution has given federal judges a role as sponsors of ADR and
facilitators of settlement.92 Under the umbrella of "courts," we find
not only adjudication and withdrawal of lawsuits, but also many inter-
mediate steps, such as court-annexed arbitration, summary jury trials,
mediation, and judicial settlement conferences.93 Some commentators
argue for expanded use of these procedures to augment or to replace
adjudication.94 Just as one might be tempted to draw a line between
trials and other modes of adjudication, why not distinguish between
adjudication and settlement? After all, adjudication is that moment
when judges impose outcomes enforced by the state, while settlements
are only agreements reached by parties.
The difficulty here is that both adjudication and settlements
achieved after lawsuits are filed may well be mixtures of "public" and
"private" decisionmaking. Even if one wished to confine a public dimen-
sion to only those instances when norms are being applied, when
89. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, ANALYSIS OF THE WORKLOAD OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS FOR THE TwELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1985 [hereinafter
U.S. WORKLOAD, 1985] at Table C-4 (4.7% of all civil actions reached trial) and Table D-4
(extrapolated, 12.7% of all criminal defendants reached trial). In this comparison, the civil actions
are counted by case whereas the criminal statistics are tabulated by defendant, rather than by
case.
90. See generally Ordinary Litigation, supra note 28; Kerwin, Henderson, & Baar, Ad-
judicatory Processes and the Organization of Trial Courts, 70 JUDICATURE 99 (1986).
91. See Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 82:3,
824-26 (1985); Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Needfor a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808 (1986).
92. See generally Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 494, 534-40 (1986).
93. D. HENSLER, A. LIPSON, & E. ROLPH, JUDICIAL ARBITRATION IN CALIFORNIA
(Inst. for Civil Justice, Rand Corp. 1981); D. HENSLER, WHAT WE KNow AND DON'T KNow
ABOUT COURT-ADMINISTERED ARBITRATION (Inst. for Civil Justice, Rand Corp. 1986).
94. See Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a
Case frtYm Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770 (1981).
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education, accuracy, or control is needed, when interaction will assist
and inform norm generation, one must aclmowledge that such instances
occur at summary judgment and settlement as well as at trials and
adjudication.
When filing a complaint, a plaintiff defines the limits of a court's
inquiry. When answering, a defendant limits that inquiry further by
admitting certain facts or issues. By stipulations of law or fact, the
parties may further circumscribe the arena in which the judge or jury
acts. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial judge is
supposed to make "findings of fact" and "conclusions of law."95 I have
written documents called "proposed findings of fact and conclusions
of law," after which a trial judge has whited out the word "proposed"
and signed his name. While adopting parties' submissions in this fash-
ion may not endear a trial judge to an appellate COurt,96 the document
generated nevertheless bears the title "judgment," and we say that
adjudication has occurred. Further, parties may "consent" to the entry
of judgment, and once again the documents become "judgments" even
though the words may be written by the parties.97
On the other side, "private" settlements may also be formulated
,vith substantial judicial input. In many instances, lawsuits are filed,
the parties litigate some issues, and then come to an agreement. A
judge's ruling on a contested but non-dispositive issue may be pivotal
to a subsequent settlement. Even without adjudication, judicial com-
mentary on the case may profoundly influence the agreements
reached.93
I am not alone in noticing the problems of capturing what might
be meant by the term "judicial action." In Janus Films, Inc. v. Mil-
ler,99 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit struggled to delineate
instances of judicial action from those for which the parties bore re-
sponsibility. The question was whether an individual was bound by a
judgment entered: had the parties consented, or had the judge adjudi-
95. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 52(a).
96. See Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1294 (10th Cir. 1974) ("The mechanical
adoption of a litigant's findings is an abandonment of the duty imposed on trial judges ....");
111 re Colony Square Co., 819 F.2d 272 (11th Cir. 1987) (no per se reversal when litigant has
ghost written a court's order); cf. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 572 (1985) ("[E]ven
when the trial judge adopts proposed findings verbatim, the findings are those of the court and
may be reversed only if clearly erroneous.").
97. See Resnik, Judging Consent, 2 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcoming, 1987).
98. See Sarokin, Justice Rushed Is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431 (1986);
Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 337 (1986).
99. 801 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1986).
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cated the matter? Hoping to mark the boundaries, Judge Jon O. New-
man, writing for the Second Circuit, first defined adjudication as those
instances when a
judge determines all aspects of the relief to be awarded and
enters what has been called an adjudicated judgment . . . .
The wording of such a judgment is determined by the judge,
who may draft it, accept the draft proposed by the winning
party, or adopt portions of draft language proposed by any
of the parties. loo
The alternatives are forms of settlement. The parties may settle and
the judge may sign a stipulation of dismissal. lo1 If the parties agree
to settle but want a court order, the court may enter a consent judg-
ment. Here the Second Circuit drew new lines. In a ''true consent
judgment," "all the relief to be provided by the judgment is agreed
to by the parties. The court makes no determination of the merits of
the controversy or of the relief to be awarded."102 In contrast, in a
"settlement judgment" the parties have agreed on the com-
ponents of a judgment, including the basic aspects of relief,
but have not agreed on all the details or the wording . . . .
The components . . . are . . . reported to the court on the
record [and] . . . the judge is obliged to determine the de-
tailed terms of the relief and the wording of the judgment.103
Janus Films helps us understand that judges do a lot of adjudica-
tory-like activity, not all of which falls under the category of what the
Second Circuit called an "adjudicated judgment."104 From other com-
mentary, we know that judges do a lot of advising/adjudicating, not
100. [d. at 581-82.
101. FED. R. CIV. P. 41.
102. 801 F.2d at 582.
103. [d. The court provided yet another set of distinctions to resolve the issue of whether
judgments must include side agreements that permit payments of amounts less than those stated
on the face of the judgment. The court distinguished between "private judgments" (involving
"a tort or a breach of contract") and ''public judgments" (such as the Janus case, in which "a
judgment resolves a dispute concerning a copyright that may be enforced against other members
of the public"). [d. at 584-85. Cj. Green, Tort Law: Public Law in Disguise, Parts [ and II,
38 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 257 (1959), reprinted in L. GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT
LAW (1965).
104. See also Huertas v. East River Housing Corp., 813 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1987) (trial judge
deeply involved in settlement impermissibly ordered the payment of attorneys' fees).
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all of which is transformed into "judgments."los Social scientists remind
us that mediators invoke norms in their efforts to assist parties in
reaching compromises106 and that participants in bilateral negotiations
also rely upon norms embedded in their social context. 107 Publicly-em-
powered officials do much of their decisionmaking outside the context
of trials and of formal adjudication. lOS
IV. THE PROBLEMS OF A PUBLIC DIMENSION
I have shown how some traditional distinctions do not answer the
question of what kind of adjudicatory-based decisions could be under-
stood as including a public dimension. I would be remiss, however, if
I failed to point out the limits of my own comments. First, my focus
has been on court-based activity. There is "public" decisionmaking in
institutions other than courts; indeed, much of what agencies do is
adjudicatory in nature. 109 The Social Security Administration alone
disposes of more cases in a single year than do all federal trial judges
combined.110 Thus, if claims for a public dimension persuade, such a
dimension should be considered in other institutions.
105. See, e.g., Edwards v. Born, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 580 (D.V.I. 1985), vacated and re-
manded, 792 F.2d 387 (3d Cir. 1986); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 14; Peckham, supra note 94;
Resnik, Managerial Judge.s, 96 HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982).
106. See Sibley & Merry, Mediator Settlement Strategies, 8 LAW & POL'Y 7 (1986); Plett,
lIfediation and Settlement of Building Construction Disp'u,tes: The Case of the "Bau-
Schlichtungstelle" (Inst. for Legal Studies, Union of Wis., Dispute Processing Research Program,
Working Papers Series 7, Mar. 1986); Bernard, Floger, Weingarten, & Zumeta, The Neutral
Mediator: Value Dilemmas in DivCYfce Mediation, in ETHICS, STANDARDS, AND PROFES-
SIONAL CHALLENGES 61 (J. Lemmon ed. June, 1984).
107. See Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 HARv. L. REV. 637 (1976).
108. See Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161
(1986); Sarokin, supra note 98; see also Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1985) (judge
impermissibily imposed sanctions when litigants refused to settle at the time the judge
suggested).
109. In 1984, there were 515 Article III trial judges and 1121 administrative law judges.
See 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 129
(1984) [hereinafter U.S. WORK LOAD 1984]; Lubbers, Federal Agency Adjudication: Trying to
See the Forest and the Trees, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 383 (1984).
110. In 1984, the Social Security Administration made 337,459 dispositions. SOCIAL SE-
CURITY ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF HEARINGS & APPEALS OPERATIONAL REPORT 26
(Sept. 1984). In 1984, federal trial judges disposed of 243,000 civil cases and 44,501 "defendant
dispositions." REPORT OF DIRECTOR, supra note 109; U.S. WORKLOAD, 1985, supra note 89,
at 179 (note again that civil action dispositions are measured by "cases" while criminal action
dispositions are measured by "defendants").
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Second, if lawsuits are important moments that implicate the pub-
lic, so are many disputes that are never transformed into lawsuits.
Disputes on both sides of the line marked by the filing of a complaint
can be identical in relevance to the public. The category ''lawsuit'' is
both under and over inclusive of the conflicts in this society important
to us all. In defense of drawing that line, I can say that once a lawsuit
has been filed, we know at least one of the disputants has claimed
that public norms govern a conflict. Further, we conserve the costs
of searching to find disputes because a participant has brought the
conflict forward. Moreover, one of the disputants has weighed the
personal and the public elements of the dispute and has opted in favor
of an appeal to the public. Nonetheless, using the filing of a lawsuit
as a trigger for a public dimension remains problematic.
Third, given the many "publics," surely there will be conflict about
the value of a public dimension. What about the public's interest in
providing inexpensive and speedy dispute resolution? Wouldn't the
acknowledgment of a public dimension slow the process? Increase the
costs? Expense is often waved as a flag in the world of due process.
But costs in and of themselves cannot be a total trump. It would be
inexpensive to flip a coin to reach a judgment, but coin flipping is
considered inappropriate behavior for judges. III The real question, of
course, is one of costs and benefits, and the answers are subjective
and depend upon what one counts as costs and benefits. u2 For ex-
ample, we know that parties to lawsuits sometimes bargain for
secrecy in exchange for money-.113 Depending upon how we were to
provide for a public dimension, we might preclude such bargains. u4
Such a rule could have an impact on the kinds of cases filed and on
the kinds of bargains struck. U5 Should such a result be characterized
111. Shipp, Friess is Barredfrom Ever Being New York Judge, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 19S:3
at B3, col. 1 (New York judge flipped coin to decide whether to sentence an individual to ten
or to twenty days. "Abdicating such solemn responsibilities ... is inexcusable ....").
112. Costs are typically calculated only by estimations of the price of reaching a decision
by a particular procedure. This narrow view of costs can be contrasted to an estimation that
wonld include the costs of erroneous decisionmaking as well as an estimation that would com-
prehend non-monetizable "costs." See Mashaw, supra note 4.
113. See the recent reports of litigation involving alleged defects in cigarette lighters.
Lewin, Bic Is Facing a Rising Tide of Pers01U1l Injury Suits, N.Y. Times, April 10, 1987, at
1, col. 4; Gilpin, Bic Says There are 42 Suits, N.Y. Times, April 17, 1987, at 29, col. 1.
114. See, e.g., Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800
F .2d 339 (3d Cir. 1986) (access to settlement agreement filed with the court).
115. See Janus Films, 801 F.2d at 585
If the parties to a dispute ... are reluctant to disclose the terms of their agreements
HeinOnline -- 39 U. Fla. L. Rev. 429 1987
1987] PUBLIC DIMENSION 429
as a "cost" or as a ''benefit''? The answer might well depend upon the
kind of case, the nature of the bargain, and the relative capacity and
resources of those who bargain.
Fourth, recognition of a public dimension may well spark concern
about litigants' autonomy. If parties consent to the withdrawal of a
lawsuit, why might the public have an interest? Unlike some commen-
tators,116 I am not sanguine about party consent. We know that litiga-
tion is expensive, that lawyers do not always serve their clients' in-
terests, and that litigants are often risk-adverse. 117 Given these condi-
tions, "consent" is problematic and does not for me resolve the question
about whether a dispute has a public dimension.
But what about privacy? Parties are not required to file lawsuits.
If they decide to forego adjudication, why should the public claim any
role? Lawsuits can involve issues of great personal moment; to borrow
my colleague Margaret Jane Radin's term, one's "personhood" may
well be at stake. 118 The thought that uncaring others might have access
to details of one's most intimate actions may well deter many from
seeking judicial remedies. If public participation were permitted at all
moments, many might retreat still further. Can an abstract principle
of a "public dimension" justify such intrusions?
One response is that the pain of court processes is not limited to
lawsuits of any particular genre or to trials as contrasted with filed
complaints. Terry Allen, the "civil" defendant accused of being a "sex-
ually dangerous" person, may well have been disheartened by the
prospect that the public could learn about his alleged misbehavior.
Every woman who has been a plaintiff in a lawsuit seeking an abortion
or claiming injury from an intrauterine device must feel the pain of
having the personal thrust so unequivocally into the realm of the
political. Others may gain from the stories told, but those whose lives
are the bases for the sagas may well have contributed with anguish.
Yet, recognition of a public dimension does not demand that personal
interests have no sway. One need not conflate the personal and the
. . . , they remain free to forgo entry of a judgment and settle their litigation by
a withdrawal of action, keeping confidential all aspects of their settlement. They
may not, however, secure a judicial imprimatur for an obligation that the parties
have agreed means less than its terms state.
116. Easterbrook, JlI.stue and Conf:ract in Judgments, 2 U. CHI. LEGAL FORUM (forthcom-
ing 1987).
117. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987).
118. Radin, Property and Personlwod. 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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private, the totalitarian and the public.1l9 To acknowledge a public
dimension is not to obliterate any sensitivity to the personal elements
that ought to be considered when deciding how to provide process
and how to create a role for the public in a particular case.120
v. THE FORMS OF PARTICIPATION
Conceiving of a role for the public at trials makes the question of
the forms of participation simple. Trials can occur in front of an audi-
ence; the public, or a subset thereof, may sit, watch, recount, listen,
and respond. But if one considers the possibility of other instances
(such as when judges decide summary judgment motions or discuss
settlement with parties) as moments in which the public has some
role, the question of the form of participation seems far more complex.
Should we require judges to work in open offices? Should we mandate
that litigants discuss settlements in places where strangers can listen?
Should jury deliberations be open?121 Or can we conceptualize a role
for the public that goes beyond the tradition of "access" to the courts?
119. Cj. Mnoookin, The Public/Private DicMromy: Political Disagreement and Academic
Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1440 (1982) ("To what extent should individual interests
be subordinated to collective control?"). Compare Gavison's discussion of the private, supra note
74.
120. Even within a tradition of access to trials, courts have sanctioned many closures. See,
e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (upholding secret military trial of individuals captured
in the United States and charged with sabotage), In re Reporters Comm., 773 F.2d 1325 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); cj. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948) (secret trial of defendant for criminal contempt
intolerable); Dammerau v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 285, 349 S.E.2d 409 (1986) (finding no
violation of a state constitutional right to a public trial by a trial held in correctional facility to
which there was limited access). For discussion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-11, see United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Kornblum
& Jachnycky, American's Secret Court: Listening in on Espionage and Terrorism, 24 JUDGES'
JOURNAL 15 (Summer 1985). See also The First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry &
Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (pennsylvania statute limiting public access to disci-
plinary files of judges not unconstitutional); see generally Shaman & Begue, Silence Isn't Always
Golden: Reassessing Confidentiality in the Judicial Disciplinary Process, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 755
(1985); Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Slwuld Litigants Be Permitted
to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985).
Moreover, were we genuinely concerned about the pain of adjudication, we would turn our
attention not only to public involvement in the process but would also want to consider how
litigants experienced other aspects of their interaction with the judicial system.
121. While jury deliberations are generally secret, see Inside the Jury Room (pBS
"Frontline" Documentary) (videocassette available from PBS) (jury deliberations recorded on
camera). See also United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 140-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cm. denied,
446 U.S. 907 (1980) (jurors' identity concealed).
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I like to think that a public dimension does not collapse into claims
about "publicity" or "dissemination." Although both may be aspects
of public dimensions to procedure, neither are the complete account
nor necessarily required at every occasion. This is not the place in
which to provide a list of ways to express a public dimension. Rather,
I ask consideration of the public aspect of due process as the new
institutions of dispute resolution are being installed in our courts and
as courts defer to other modes of decisionmaking.
The Supreme Court recently decided that contracts for arbitration
between customers and brokerage firms must be enforced, despite
customers' desires to go to court and despite claims of inequality of
bargaining power.122 Are we, the public, to participate in such proce-
dures? Further, we must ask those who advocate increased use of
judicial settlement conferences, of court-annexed arbitration, of medi-
ation: are mechanisms provided for public accountability, for control
and education? How will the decisionmakers decide what compromises
to suggest? What provisions are there for the creation of shared
stories? Are records kept? Are aggregate data collected and reported?
Are random cases sampled and reviewed? How does one envision that
norms will develop or shift? Is the assumption that traditional adjudi-
cation will continue to be the locus for norm generation? Who will
decide which cases merit the "trial" track and which will be sent to
other, less visible modes of decisionmaking? Alternatively, is the as-
sumption that, in presumptively less "adversarial" moments, the public
has no interest? Or is the assumption that the interest is already
represented by those present?
VI. CONCLUSION
If one believes that law exists independent of the moments when
legal rules are applied to facts, that adjudication is not a political act,
and that state-empowered judges and their surrogates are not political
actors, one might pay little attention to legal processes. But many
who urge us to reconceive of our legal processes do not make such
claims. Thus, we must ask them: is any commitment made to a public
dimension, or what explains the decision to ignore that aspect of due
process?
122. ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987). Arguments in
favor of expanded use of arbitration are set forth in Fletcher, Privatizing Serntrities Disputes
thraugh the Enforcement of A:rbitmtian Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV. 393 (1987).
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